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I. INTRODUCTION
In today's day and age, where technology is continually both changing and
advancing, it is no wonder that patents have become the lifeblood of the
inventive economy. With the increasing amount of patents filed year after year
comes a proportionate increase in patent litigation. While patent disputes are
traditionally heard by the judiciary, preservation of judicial resources has called
for an increasing reliance upon administrative courts to fill this void. At the
same time however, the increase in patent litigation and the shifting reliance on
administrative courts in supplanting certain roles of the judiciary has also begun
to result in a litany of patent-related problems.
Although the Leay-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA)' was intended to
improve some of these issues, many of its provisions create additional problems
and have even necessitated intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court, the patent
docket of which has substantially increased within the last few terms.2
Despite the Supreme Court's desire to help sort out the current mess, there
is one significant issue that stands above them all, of which the Supreme Court
has yet to hear. In delegating unbridled power to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) under the AIA (specifically pertaining to ex parte
patent reexamination procedures), 3 Congress' has effectively allowed for
unconstitutional re-openings of finally adjudicated federal court decisions.
Since the number of patent reexaminations has steadily increased over the
last eight years, 4 and because the new provisions of the AIA are aimed, in part,
at further expanding the availability and efficiency of these reexamination
procedures,5 these problems are likely to multiply and compound the current
1 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) [hereinafter
AIA] (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
2 See, e.g., Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013);
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 133
S. Ct. 2393 (2013).
3 See AIA, supra note 1, § 7(c)(1), 125 Stat. 314 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006)) ("A patent
owner who is dissatisfied with the final decision in an appeal of a reexamination to the
[PTAB] ... may appeal the Board's decision on# to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit." (emphasis added)).
4 See Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures: Recent Trends,
Strateies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRoP. L. 381, 381 (2009).
5 See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45-46 & n.31 (une 1, 2011), reprinted in 2011
U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 75-76 ("Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the
validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement
litigation .... The reexamination of issued patents could be conducted with a fraction of the
time and cost of formal legal proceedings and would help restore confidence in the effectiveness
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dissent among patent owners. Given such imminent and probable expansion,
this Note argues that, even absent any congressional amendments to the patent
reexamination provisions of the AIA, patent holders may nevertheless rejoice-
a Supreme Court resolution may be just around the corner.
Part II of this Note discusses the history of the United States Patent System
and its societal importance. In explaining some of the more subtle changes that
the AIA makes to patent reexamination jurisdiction, Part III serves as
background requisite to a complete understanding of the larger constitutional
concerns discussed in Parts IV and V, which analyze the constitutionality of the
USPTO's abrogation of final judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC). Finally, this Note concludes that should the Supreme Court
choose to hear this issue, it will likely find the ex parte patent reexamination
provisions of the AIA (as interpreted by the USPTO) to be unconstitutional
encroachments on separation of powers principles.
II. BACKGROUND
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM
In the spirit of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts and
sciences," the United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact
laws providing inventors with a limited monopoly over their creations.6 In
exercising this authority, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790,7 which
grants a patent owner the ability to prevent others from making, using, or
selling his particular invention in the United States for a twenty-year time
period.8
In order to receive a patent, an application must present, with particularity, a
distinctive claim regarding the invention to be patented, and disclose the best
mode of practicing the invention.9 This is precisely the stage at which the
USPTO gets involved.
of our patent system." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6462-63 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries').
7 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2012)).
8 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2).
9 The AIA eliminated the so-called "best mode defense" as a method of invalidating U.S.
patent claims. See AIA, supra note 1, § 15 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 282 to state "that the failure to
disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be. .. held
3
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B. THE USPTO AND ITS EXECUTIVE NATURE
The USPTO 1° is the executive agency charged with carrying out the patent
laws enacted by Congress," and is responsible for examining each patent
application to determine whether a patent should be issued.' 2  As an
administrative agency of the federal government, it is subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),13 enacted in 1946, which sets forth a
system for judicial review of administrative agencies to ensure that the agency is
acting in accordance with the Constitution and Congress's statutory
commands. 14 Judicial review under the APA is an important check on
executive power, ensuring compliance with the constitutionally-rooted doctrine
of separation of powers.'"
C. THE RISE OF PATENT REEXAMINATION
Patent reexamination comes into play after a patent has been issued; it is a
statutory process by which a patent holder or a third party can have the patent
reexamined by the USPTO to determine whether the subject matter is still
patentable, usually in light of a prior art.16 Fundamental to this decision is the
question of whether the prior art raises a "substantial new question of
patentability" on at least one claim.17 The purpose of the substantial new
question requirement is two-fold: to prevent the patent owner from being
subjected to multiple reexaminations based on the same references, and to
invalid.'). Notably however, the AIA left the statutory requirement that applicants disclose the
best mode of practicing their inventions unperturbed. 35 U.S.C. 5 112(a)-(b).
10 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, an administrative agency within the Department of
Commerce, is under the political direction of the Secretary of Commerce. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (a). The
Director of the Patent and Trademark Office is "appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate." Id. § 3(a)(1). The Commissioner of Patents is appointed by
the Secretary of Commerce and is charged with overseeing the Operations of the "office relating
to patents."
"1 See id. § 1(a), 2(a); see also Peter J. Corcoran III, Administrative Procedure Act Standards Governing
Judicial Revw of Findings of Fact Made by the Patent and Trademark Office, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1
& n.1 (Fall 2000), availabk at http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v7il/artidel.html.
12 See 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1).
13 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. %§ 551-559, 701-706 (2012).
14 Id
15 See Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 77
(2010); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-556 (1982).
16 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
17 Id § 304; see aLso U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2216 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP].
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prevent harassment of the patent owner.' 8 The reexamination proceeding can
be initiated through the request of either the patent owner or a third party.' 9 A
third party, claiming a particular patent is invalid, may seek a patent's
reexamination in order to invalidate a patent holder's claim to the patent.20 A
patent owner may also request a reexamination in order to verify that his patent
claims are still valid in light of any prior new art.21
One purpose of patent reexamination, as established by Congress, is to"strengthen[ ] investor confidence in the certainty of patent rights by creating a
system of administrative reexamination of doubtful patents." It allows a
patent owner to validate, or a party challenging the patent to invalidate, the
patent without resorting to lengthy and expensive court procedures.23
Before the AIA was signed into law, two different types of reexaminations
were available: (1) inter partes reexamination, and (2) ex parte reexamination. 24
Inter partes reexaminations are requested by members of the public, who then
continue to take part in the reexamination proceeding before the USPTO.25 Ex
parte reexaminations, which were statutorily enacted under the Patent and
Trademark Law Amendments Act of 1980 (Bay-Dole Ac), 26 do not involve the
requesting party in the proceeding once reexamination is initiated. 27 Rather, ex
parte reexaminations involve only the USPTO examiner and the patent
owner.28
18 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 7 (1980) ("This 'substantial new question' requirement
would protect patentees from having to respond to, or participate in unjustified reexaminations.
Further, it would act to be reconsideration of any argument already decided by the Office .... ");
see also H.R. REP. No. 107-120, at 1 ("As part of the original .1980 reexamination statute,
Congress struck a balance between curing allegedly defective patents and preventing harassment
of patentees. It adopted a standard requiring a request for reexamination to raise a 'substantial
new question of patentability.'" (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101; H.R. REP. No. 96-1307 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460)).
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) ("Any person at any time may file a request for
reexamination . ..
20 J. Steven Boughman, Reexamining Reexaminations: A Fresh Look at the Ex Parte and Inter Partes
Mechanisms for Reviewing Issued Patents, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 349, 351 (2007).
21 Id.
22 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980), repintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4726, 6462.
23 Id. at 3-4,1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6462-63.
24 See Charles E. Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, Interpreive Ageng--Rukmaking vs. Statutory Disttc
Court Review--Jurisdiction In Ex Parte Patent Reexaminations, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
498, 504 (2010) (discussing types of patent reexamination).
25 Id
26 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-17 (1980).
27 Miller & Archibald, supra note 24, at 505.
28 Id
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To order a reexamination proceeding, the patent examiner or Director of
the USPTO (Director) is to determine if "a substantial new question of
patentability" exists regarding the claim(s) to the patent.29 Particularly for ex
parte patent reexaminations, the reexamination request must include "[a]
statement pointing out each substantial new question of patentability based on
prior pitents and printed publications." 30  A reexamination request will be
granted if the examiner determines that such a substantial new question of
patentability exists.31
If a party in an ex parte reexamination proceeding is adversely affected by
the decision of the USPTO examiner, that party can appeal 32 either to the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) or to the Director.33 Following an
unfavorable appeal, the statute, prior to amendment by the AIA, explicitly
provided the patent holder with two routes of judicial review: (1) a civil suit
against the Director in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,34 or
(2) a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.35
The ability to choose from these dual routes of judicial review from USPTO
administrative decisions has been a central part of the U.S. patent system since
"long before the inception of ex parte reexamination in 1980."36 This is
because the USPTO is an administrative agency, established under the
Executive Branch of the federal government.37 As governed by the APA, final
decisions must necessarily be subject to review by an Article II138 judicial
court.39 The PTAB also issues administrative decisions, which, because the
PTAB is within the USPTO, must also be subject to judicial review.40 This is
necessary to properly effectuate our national system of checks and balances, as
29 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2012); 37 C.F.R. % 1.515(a), 1.520 (2012).
30 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(1) (2012).31 Id. § 1.525(a).
32 35 U.SC. § 306 (2012).
33 Id § 134(b). "A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any
claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for
such appeal." A third party, however, may only appeal to the Director and does not have the
option of going to the PTAB. 37 C.F.R § 1.525, 1.181 (2012).
34 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2006).
35 See id. § 306 (stating what avenues of appeal are available to one adversely affected by a
decision).
36 Miller & Archibald, supra note 24, at 507-08.
37 Id. at 507.
38 An Article III court is one created by the Constitution as part of the judicial branch, as
opposed to one formed by Congress under Article II or by the Executive Branch under Article I.
Seegeneral# U.S. CONST. art. III.
39 Id
40 See Miller & Archibald, supra note 24, at 507.
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judicial review serves as a crucial check on the PTAB and ensures fairness in
our patent system.41
III. BACKGROUND: BASIC CHANGES MADE BY THE AIA
The AIA, which came into effect on September 16, 2012,42 changed the
availability of these dual routes of judicial review for ex parte and inter partes
proceedings. The AIA amended 35 U.S.C. § 30643 to state:
The patent owner involved in a reexamination proceeding under
this chapter may appeal under the provisions of section 134, and
may seek court review under the provisions of sections
141 to 144, with respect to any decision adverse to the
patentability of any original or proposed amended or new claim
of the patent.44
Thus, the AIA explicitly amends the statute to exclude the option under 35
U.S.C. § 145 to file a civil suit against the Director of the USPTO in district
court. Furthermore, it amends 35 U.S.C. § 141(b)45 to provide that "[a] patent
owner who is dissatisfied with the final decision in an appeal of reexamination
to the [PTAB] under section 134(b) may appeal the Board's decision only to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."46  Rather than
permitting the party to appeal an adverse final decision of the PTAB to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, as previously allowed, the only
post-AlA recourse for adversely affected parties is through an appeal directly to
the CAFC.47
41 Charles E. Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, Beware the Suppression of District-Court Jurisdiction of
Administrative Deisions..., 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 124, 164 (2013); see id at 534
(concluding that rendering district court review of USPTO administrative decisions would "make
the [PTAB] ... tantamount to the status of an Article III court").
42 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 35, 125 Star. 284, 341 (2011)
(setting the default effective date of the Act).
43 Id. § 6(h)(2)(A), 125 Stat. 312 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2006)).
- 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2012).
45 AA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7(c)(1), 125 Stat. 314.
- 35 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
47 Id.
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A. DISTRICT AND APPELLATE COURT REVIEW DISTINGUISHED
To understand the greater importance of this subtle change and why it has
sparked anger amongst patent owners, it is important to understand more
closely the differences between district and appellate court review. District
court review is typically an open-record proceeding, meaning that parties are
allowed to admit new evidence that may not have been available during the
previous reexamination proceeding.48 A direct appeal to the CAFC, on the
other hand, is primarily decided on a closed-fact record49-even if new and
useful evidence or testimony becomes available, it will not be admissible.
Rather, the CAFC will only look to the evidentiary record adduced during the
prior USPTO proceedings.50 Furthermore, whereas a district court judge has
the power to compel production of evidence and subpoena necessary witnesses
to the action,5' the USPTO typically has no such authority. As a result, it is
possible that important evidence may go un-entered.5 2 Finally, the district court
enables a de novo trial proceeding,53 meaning all evidence is evaluated anew,
without any deference from the previous decisions of the USPTO, including
PTAB determinations.5 4 The CAFC, on the other hand, does not evaluate the
decision anew.55 Instead, it substantially defers to the fact-finding and decision-
making of the PTAB when rendering its opinion, and will reverse the decision
only under a "no substantial evidence" test-in other words, when the record
contains no substantial evidence to support the decision.5 6
B. THE FIRST STAB AT UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
The disadvantages patent owners faced as a result of the AIA's restrictions
on appellate review jurisdiction resulted in the first attack against the AIA on
constitutionality grounds.
48 Miller & Archibald, supra note 24, at 514, 516, 532.
49 Id. at 532.
50 Id. at 516.
51 Miller & Archibald, supra note 41, at 143-44.
52 Id. at 144.
53 Miller & Archibald, supra note 24, at 516.
54 Id
55 Id
56 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152-53, 162-65 (holding that the CAFC must apply the
"substantial evidence" standard, as prescribed by the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 706, when reviewing
USPTO decisions).
[Vol. 21:165
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The APA, as previously mentioned, governs the ways and methods by which
federal administrative agencies may establish regulations.5 7 Under the APA,
U.S. federal courts have the ability to directly review agency decisions.5 8
Specifically, a party facing an adverse decision by an administrative agency has
standing to seek judicial review by an Article III court under a "three-part test
(pure question of law, finality, and immediate hardship)" in in order to satisfy
the ripeness and case or controversy standing requirements.5 9 Because an ex
parte reexamination proceeding is considered to be a case or controversy when
at least two parties are involved (the patent owner and the USPTO),60 critics
argued that under the APA and Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, an appeal from
a final decision of the PTAB in an ex parte reexamination proceeding
necessitates judicial review by an Article III district court.61 By amending the
availability of traditional district court review to provide only for a more
narrow, deferred review by the CAFC, critics argued this new AIA provision
was unconstitutional, 62 as the PTAB would not properly be considered an
administrative court.63
Whether this argument has merit is not the subject of this Note. Rather, it is
significant in that the touchstones of this argument helped set the stage for a
much greater attack on the AIA's new reexamination regime.
IV. CAFC vs. PTAB: WHOSE DECISION IS IT ANYWAY?
A. PATENT REEXAMINATION: REVISITED
Ex parte patent reexamination was established in 1980.64 At the time, patent
infringement litigation was conducted through proceedings in federal district
court.65 Congress was concerned, however, with the burden this process placed
on patent owners who wanted to test the validity of their patents in light of
57 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. % 551-559 (2012).
58 Id. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.").
59 Miller & Archibald, supra note 24, at 507.
60 Id. at 507-08.
61 Id. at 512-20; see also Miller & Archibald, supra note 41, at 164-65.
62 Miller & Archibald, supra note 24.
63 See, e.g., id. at 532 (arguing against the Senate's proposed "Manager's Amendment of 5.515"
that pre-dated the AIA).
64 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015-17.
65 See Miller & Archibald, supra note 41, at 150.
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prior art.66 Specifically, Congress believed that limiting this process to district
courts was a slow and expensive procedure.67 Thus, Congress established an
alternative system of patent reexamination in order to streamline the process
and reduce the costs of patent litigation.68 Instead of suing in district court, a
third party could request the USPTO to conduct an ex parte reexamination. 69
A third party reexamination request asks the USPTO to reexamine the validity
of a specific patent in light of prior art.70
B. A CONTRADICTORY PROBLEM OF POWER
Imagine a situation in which a party, challenging the validity of a patent, sues
the patent owner in federal district court and loses, as the court upholds the
validity of the patent. Frustrated, the patent challenger appeals the district
court's decision to the CAFC, but the CAFC affirms the district court's holding
of validity.
The patent owner, upon receiving a final and favorable ruling by an Article
III court from which no further appeal is possible, should feel secure in the
finality of the judgment. However, under the current law, the same party who
lost on appeal can take a second bite of the apple by requesting an ex parte
reexamination before the USPTO.71 If the USPTO believes, contrary to the
CAFC, that the patent should be invalid, is the USPTO constitutionally free to
disregard a finally adjudicated judicial decision? Although separation of powers
principles strongly suggest otherwise, the current law allows the USPTO to do
just that.72
C. A BACKGROUND IN FEDERAL COURT PRECEDENCE
The body of federal case law that currently upholds the USPTO's ability to
disregard and abrogate an Article III court's final adjudication of patent validity
emerged from the CAFC's holding in In re Swvanson.73 The procedural history
leading up to the dispute in this case is as follows: Abbott Laboratories (Abbott)
66 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4, repintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6462, 6463.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 3.
70 35 U.S.C. §§ 301(a)(1), 302 (2006).
71 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 3 (1980).
72 See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375-79 (Fed. Cit. 2008); see also In re Baxter Int'l Inc.,
678 F.3d 1357, 1360-61 (Fed. Cit. 2012); In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (Fed.
Cit. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting).
73 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1368.
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sued Syntron Bioresearch, Inc. (Syntron) for patent infringement in federal
district court.74 Syntron counterclaimed that the patent was invalid in light of
prior art.75 On the former issue, the jury found that the patent was not
infringed; while on the latter issue, the jury found that the prior art did not
invalidate the patent.76 On appeal, the CAFC "affirmed the judgment of
validity on all asserted claims of the ... patent."77 Syntron, despite having lost
an appeal to the highest judicial appellate court, did not cease its efforts.
Syntron, but went through the Executive Branch by requesting an ex parte
reexamination of the patent before the USPTO, once again claiming that
Abbot's patent was invalid in light of prior art.78
The prior art references Syntron presented in its request for reexamination
included one reference, presented and relied upon by both the district court in
upholding and the CAFC in affirming the patent's validity.79 Surprisingly, the
USPTO examiner granted the reexamination hearing and, contrary to the
CAFC, declared the patent invalid.8° Abbot appealed, but the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) deferred to the examiner's ruling.81
Surmodics, Inc. (Surmodics), the company that had licensed the patent to
Abbott, was surprised by the CAFC's and the USPTO's conflicting rulings.
Having already received a favorable ruling by the CAFC prior to the adverse
BPAI decision, Surmodics appealed the decision to the CAFC.82 In its appeal,
Surmodics argued that "the district court litigation precludes a finding of a new
question of patentability for the purposes of the reexamination, and.., to find
otherwise would raise substantial questions regarding the constitutionality of [35
U.S.C. § 303]."83 In essence, Surmodics argued that a substantial new question
of patentability could not exist before the USPTO since the issue had been
finally adjudicated and affirmed by the CAFC.94
The court did not fully address this argument. Instead, it affirmed the
USPTO's decision that the patent was invalid, despite the fact that the court
74 Id. at 1373; see also Abbott Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
75 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1373.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1373-74. Since this case was decided prior to the AIA, the BPAI, not the PTAB,
decided the administrative appeal.
82 Id. at 1374.
83 Id. Specifically, § 303(a) requires the existence of "a substantial new question of
patentability' before a reexamination can be granted. 35 U.S.C. 5 303(a) (2006).
84 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1374.
11
Sassano: The Rise and Fall of Patent Reexamination Under the America Inven
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2013
J. INTELL PROP. L[l
itself had previously upheld the validity of the patent based upon the same
claims subsequently before the USPTO.ss Although the court recognized the
anomaly, it nevertheless concluded that "the statutory language, legislative
history, and different purposes underlying reexamination and federal court
proceedings suggest that the determination of a substantial new question is
unaffected by these court decisions."86  Largely dismissing the appellant's
constitutional arguments, the court attributed the contradictory outcomes to the
differing standards of proof required to show a patent's invalidity in civil
litigation-"clear and convincing evidence"-and USPTO reexaminations-"a
preponderance of the evidence"-with the latter being a lower burden.87
It was not long before a similar controversy arose in In re Construction
Equipment Co.88 Despite a prior and final CAFC decision affirming the district
court's decision upholding the validity of a patent, the BPAI, upon a patent
reexamination requested by the losing party from the prior litigation, decided
the patent was invalid.8 9 The patent holder appealed the BPAI's decision to the
CAFC.90 The court, however, once again upheld the decision of the BPAI and
disregarded its prior, contradictory ruling.91 In the majority's brief response, it
scantly addressed the argument that the court's decision unconstitutionally
allows the USPTO to disregard a final adjudication by an Article III court.92 As
in Swanson, it did not appear that the majority believed the appellant's
constitutional arguments warranted much consideration.
This time, however, the gravity of the issue did not go unnoticed. In fact,
long-standing and well-respected Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman issued
a vigorous dissent.93 In her opinion, she noted that the majority's holding
illuminated a "fundamental question-is a final adjudication [upholding a
patent's validity], after trial and decision in the district court, and appeal and
final judgment in the Federal Circuit, truly final? Or is it an inconsequential
detour along the administrative path to a contrary result?" 94
85 Id at 1374, 1376.
86 Id. at 1376.
87 Id at 1377 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); In re Cavengy, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cit. 1985)).
88 665 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
89 Id at 1255; id. at 1257 (Newman, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1255 (majority opinion).
91 Id at 1256; see also Constr. Equip Co. v. Powerscreen of Am., Inc., 243 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (affirming the district court's ruling of invalidity prior to the reexamination proceeding).
92 In m Constr. Equp., 665 F.3d at 1256 n.3.
93 Id. at 1257-63 (Newman, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1257.
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Less than six months later, in In re Baxter,95 the USPTO once again
invalidated a patent which had been previously ruled valid by both the federal
district court and the CAFC on appeal.96 Baxter International, Inc., and Baxter
Healthcare Corporation (collectively, "Baxter ' ) held patents relating to a
hemodialysis machine-a device capable of functioning in place of a patient's
kidney by cleansing toxins from the blood using a solution called a dialysate. 97
In 2003, Fresenius USA, Inc. and Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.
(collectively, "Fresenius"), competitors of Baxter, "filed a declaratory judgment
action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, seeking ... a declaration that the patent's claims were invalid." 98
Baxter counterclaimed for infringement. Upon a jury determination of
invalidity, the district court granted Baxter's motion for judgment as a matter of
law. The court held that Fresenius failed to show the patent's invalidity by clear
and convincing evidence, and the court awarded Baxter damages totaling
approximately $14 million.99 On appeal in 2009, the CAFC affirmed the district
court's judgment, "conclud[ing] that Fresenius failed to present any evidence-
let alone substantial evidence-that the [patent claims were invalid in light of]
the prior art."'100 As to the other patents at issue, however, the CAFC reversed,
vacating and remanding the damage award for further consideration.' 0'
Meanwhile, the district court litigation was still ongoing, Fresenius, in 2006,
requested an ex parte reexamination of the Baxter patents by the USPTO. 102
The patent examiner found that many of the prior art references, including
those submitted before the district court during the ongoing litigation,
rendered many of Baxter's patent claims obvious and declared the claims
invalid. 0 3 Baxter subsequently appealed the examiner's decision to the BPAI,
which affirmed the examiner's determination of invalidity.1' 4 Although
ordered to consider the CAFC's opinion and recognize that the claims were
not proven invalid in court, 0 5 the BPAI held that because the USPTO applies
95 In re Baxter Int'l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
96 Id. at 1358.
97 Id
98 Id. at 1360.
99 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
100 In reBaxter, 678 F.3d at 1360.
101 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
102 In reBaxter, 678 F.3d 1357, 1360.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 The BPAI did not issue its decision on the examiner's rejections until after the CAFC
affirmed the district court's ruling, although the Director ordered the Board to consider the
CAFC's opinion. Id.
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"a lower standard of proof and the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard of claim construction ... the agency is not bound by the court's
determination."1 06
On appeal, the CAFC upheld the decision of the BPAI.107 The majority
again cited the rationale in Swanson as grounds for allowing this conflicting
result. 0 8 Judge Newman once again forcefully dissented, scolding the majority
for failing to recognize the constitutional issue, that "[n]o authority, no theory,
no law or history, permits administrative nullification of a final judicial
decision. No concept of government authorizes an administrative agency to
override or disregard the final judgment of a court. Judicial rulings are not
advisory; they are obligatory.' 10 9
The majority, responding to Judge Newman's criticism, shied away from
the constitutional issue and once again defended its holding based primarily
on the same standard of proof distinction proffered in Swanson." 0 However,
this time the court curiously conceded that
[W]hen a party who has lost in a court proceeding challenging a
patent, from which no additional appeal is possible, provokes a
reexamination in the [US]PTO, using the same presentations
and arguments, even with a more lenient standard of proof, the
[US]PTO ideally should not arrive at a different conclusion.111
106 Id. at 1360-61 (quoting Ex Parte Baxter Int'l, Inc., No. 2009-006493, 2010 WL 1048980
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 18, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Id. at 1366.
108 Id. at 1364 ("[T]he PTO in reexamination proceedings and the court system in patent
infringement actions 'take different approaches in determining validity and on the same evidence
could quite correctly come to different conclusions.'" (quoting In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368,
1377 (Fed. Cit. 2008))).
109 In re Constr. Equo, 665 F.3d at 1366 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman also explained
the policy rationale behind this by citing to the U.S. Supreme Court's language S. Pac. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897) ("This general rule is demanded by the very object for which
civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the
maintenance of social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the
vindication of rights of person and property if, as between parties and their privies,
conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly
put in issue, and actually determined by them.").
110 Id at 1364-65 (majority opinion).
111 Id. at 1365 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 21:165
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss1/7
2013] THE RISE AND FALL OF PATENT REEXAMINATION 179
Thus, despite its holding to the contrary, the majority seemed to agree that the
court should not "elevat[e] a decision by the [US]PTO over a decision by a
federal district court, which [] has been affirmed by th[e] [CAFC .... ."112
Despite such acquiescence, the majority allowed this very questionable result
to occur. Why?
The majority's primary rationale, as mentioned earlier, was that a uniform
decision, although ideal, is not constitutionally compelled since federal courts
and the USPTO apply differing standards of proof when determining the issue
of patent validity." 3 Second, while the court conceded that the USPTO should
not arrive at a different conclusion than that reached by the CAFC in a prior
civil proceeding (at least where the same presentations and arguments are
considered), the court claimed that the USPTO was, in fact, presented with new
arguments." 4 In addition to the claims and references examined by the CAFC,
the court found that the USPTO "relied on new prior art" references not
previously considered by the CAFC." s
Perhaps cognizant of the constitutional iceberg looming below the surface of
its decision, or perhaps due to the infirmity of its own reasoning, the majority
made clear that "this case is not about the relative primacy of the courts and the
[US]PTO, about which there can be no dispute."" 6 Rather, the court continued,
"we could not conclude that the [US]PTO was barred from conducting the
reexamination of the []patent because of the final judgment... without
overruling... Swanson, which we cannot do.""' 7
Perhaps, however, it is time for Swanson to be overruled. With the AIA
provisions aimed at making patent reexamination more accessible, the issue, if
left unresolved, will likely intensify. If so, it may soon catch the eye of the
United States Supreme Court. In fact, although on Nov. 5, 2013 an en banc
review of the Baxter decision was denied, this time, Judge Newman was not
alone in her dissenting opinion." 8 Rather, the twelve-member Federal Circuit
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. Judge Newman highly doubted the veracity of this claim, believing it to be partly
motivated by the majority's desire to avoid confronting the constitutional issue altogether. See id.
at 1369-70 (Newman, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1365 (majority opinion).
117 Id. Interestingly, the court offered no further explanation for its inability to overrule
Swanson, stating only that it "[is] bound to follow [its] own precedent as set forth by prior panels."
Id. (quoting Hometown Fin., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
11 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (O'Malley, J.,
dissenting).
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split 6-4 on the issue, with Judge Kathleen O'Malley opining 19 that the "panel
majority's decision in this case goes a long way toward rendering district courts
meaningless in the resolution of patent infringement disputes."'120
If the Supreme Court's historical stance on the issue is any indication of how
it might rule on this issue, the Court is less likely to rely on precarious principles
of stare decisis, especially while a constitutional mammoth lurks in the
foreground. Instead, based on the reasoning presented below, the Court may
very likely overrule Swanson and find the current practice of abrogating an
Article III court's final decisions to be an unconstitutional encroachment upon
the historic principles of separation of powers.
D. THE USPTO'S CURRENT STANDING AND THE ISSUE'S IMPENDING
CONFLATION
The USPTO, although cognizant of these constitutional objections prior to
the AIA's official enactment, maintains that "[t]he issuance of a final [f]ederal
[c] ourt decision upholding validity during an exparte reexamination. . . will have
no binding effect on the examination of the reexamination."' 121 The USPTO
bases its policy on the same rationale offered in Baxter, Swanson, and In re
Construction Co., stating that:
[D]istrict courts and the Office use different standards of proof
in determining invalidity, and thus, on the same evidence, could
quite correctly come to different conclusions. Specifically,
invalidity in a district court must be shown by "clear and
convincing" evidence, whereas in the Office, it is sufficient to
show nonpatentability by a "preponderance of evidence."' 122
Given the public's vast and increasing reliance upon patent reexamination in
recent years, these new changes and provisions of the AIA are likely to amplify
the current dissent among patent owners. The number of patent
reexaminations has steadily risen in the last eight years, 123 and because the new
provisions of the AIA are aimed at further expanding the availability of
119 Although Judge O'Malley's opinion was laid out in a dissent separate from Judge Newman's,
O'Malley stated, "I do agree with the panel dissent... that the panel majority's decision has
constitutional implications arising from principles dating back to Marbuy v. Madison." Id. at 1372,
n.1.
120 Id. at 1372.
121 MPEP, spra note 17, § 2286(V).
122 Id (citing Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427-28 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
123 See Gardella & Berger, spra note 4, at 381.
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reexamination, 124 this number is likely to increase even further. The natural
result of this expansion, combined with the unsettled constitutional issue
illuminated by Judge Newman, 125 will logically lead to more contradictory,
seemingly schizophrenic dissonance between the judicial and executive
branches.
E. THE SUPREME COURT'S DEEPLY ROOTED VIEW OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Supreme Court has, throughout its history, consistently defended the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 126 If the Supreme Court
decides to hear the issue, its decision will likely parallel the rationale from its
own holding in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.121
In Plaut, petitioner, Plaut, sued Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (Spendthrift) under
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).128 While
this action was pending, the Supreme Court, in an unrelated case, ruled that
any actions brought under the Exchange Act "must be commenced within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within
three years after [the] violation."' 129 Since Plaut's claim was not brought within
the statute of limitations period, the district court dismissed the action.13°
In direct response to the Supreme Court's ruling, Congress enacted the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), which
expressly allowed cases brought before, and dismissed because of, the
Supreme Court's ruling, to be reinstated by the courts. 3' Pursuant to the
FDICIA, Plaut motioned the district court to reinstate his action. 32 The
district court denied the motion, however, on grounds that the FDICIA
unconstitutionally commanded the federal courts to reopen cases that had been
finally adjudicated. 133 Plaut appealed the district court's decision all the way to
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.134
124 Id.
125 See supra notes 110, 116 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., So. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897) (holding that the Court could
not rehear evidence that was finally adjudicated in former suits between the same parties).
127 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
128 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 213.
129 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 213 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130 Id. at 214.
131 Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (2012))
(adding Section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also P/aut, 514 U.S. at 214-15.
132 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 215.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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According to the Court, the question was whether Congress could require
Article III courts to reopen cases on which the courts had already passed
judgments. 135 The Court answered in the negative, holding (on grounds eerily
applicable to the AIA) that the FDICIA violated the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. 36 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained:
[P]ower is the object of the separation-of-powers prohibition.
The prohibition is violated when an individual final judgment is
legislatively rescinded for even the very best of reasons, such as the
legislature's genuine conviction (supported by all the law
professors in the land) that the judgment was wrong; and it is
violated 40 times over when 40 final judgments are legislatively
dissolved.137
When confronted with this reasoning, one argument that opponents assert
in defense of the AIA is that Plaut is simply inapplicable.138 According to this
view, the court in Swanson explicitly considered the Supreme Court's holding in
Plaut and nevertheless determined that the reasoning did not apply to the
case. 139 The justification for this holding anchors on the fact that two different
standards of review apply in each proceeding.140 Specifically, the argument
asserts that a finally adjudicated decision of patent validity and a subsequent
USPTO decision of invalidity are not inconsistent, since both require different
standards of proof.'4' Thus, a subsequent USPTO decision that is contrary to
the federal court's holding is not actually reopening a final judgment, as was the
135 Id. at 213.
136 Id. at 217-18, 240.
137 Id. at 228.
138 See Charles J. Cooper & Vincent J. Colatriano, An Attack on Separation of Powers and Federal
Judial Power? An Anasis of the Constitufionah'iy of Section 18 of the America Invents Act, 13 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST Soc'y PRAc. GRps. 49, 50-51 (July 2012).
139 Id.
140 Interestingly, the court seemed to recognize that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that 'Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the
Executive Branch.'" In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219 (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In fact, the court even added, " '[i]t has ... been the firm and
unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive
on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.' "
Id at 1378-79 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14
(1948)). Despite this recognition, the court nevertheless concluded that "the court's final
judgment and the examiner's rejection are not duplicative-they are differing proceedings with
different evidentiary standards for validity." Id at 1379.
141 Id at 51 (citing In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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case in Plaut, since the USPTO utilizes a different method in reaching its
conclusion.
As sound as this argument may seem, it is doubtful the Supreme Court
would agree. Justice Scalia, in the very same case, opined that such reasoning
would
[L]ead to the conclusion that final judgments rendered on the
basis of a stringent (or, alternatively, liberal) rule of pleading or
proof may be set aside for retrial under a new liberal (or,
alternatively, stringent) rule of pleading or proof. This alone
provides massive scope for undoing final judgments and would
substantially subvert the doctrine of separation of powers. 42
Furthermore, to the extent this argument is advanced to fend off a similar
conclusion on collateral estoppel grounds, it is not so persuasive. Collateral
estoppel, more commonly known as issue preclusion, is the common law
estoppel doctrine preventing a party from relitigating an issue already litigated in
a prior proceeding. 143 In the Supreme Court's words, "once a court has decided
an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision ... preclude[s]
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party
to the first case."'144 An exception exists, however, for differing evidential
standards-where the "party against whom preclusion is sought had a
significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial
action than in the subsequent action."'145 The rationale is that a party who was
unable to sufficiently establish a fact by clear and convincing evidence, for
example, may be able to establish the same fact under a more lenient standard,
such as by a preponderance of the evidence. Given this exception, and the
differing standards of proof involved in deciding questions of nonobviousness,
any argument based on issue preclusion appears untenable. However, this
exception relates only to methods of factual determination, not determinations
of law. A differing standard of proof should have no bearing on the judge's
ultimate pronouncement of the law, as evidence and proof do not determine
the law itself. Insofar as the exception is based on such determinations of
nonobviousness, it is inapplicable. In fact, the Supreme Court has itself stated
that the "ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination,"' 46 and that
142 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 229.
143 See In re Commitment to Sorenson, 248 Wis. 2d 237, 243 (2001).
144 San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 336, n.16 (2005) (emphasis added).
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(4) (2013).
146 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
19
Sassano: The Rise and Fall of Patent Reexamination Under the America Inven
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2013
J. INTELL PROP. L
"[w]here the ultimate question of patent validity turns on the correct answer to
legal questions-what these subsidiary legal standards mean or how they apply
to the facts as given-today's strict standard of proof has no application."'147
What truly distinguishes Plaut from Baxter, Swanson, and In re Construction Co.,
and what truly motivates the Court's opinion, as Scalia's words reveal, has less
to do with classifications of standards of proof or principles of stare decisis, and
more to do with the deeper concept of separation of powers and its profound
constitutional role in our political system. The Framers of the Constitution
would not have assented to an executive adoption of a differing standard of
proof as a means to circumvent the separation of powers prohibition. 148 To
hold otherwise invites the notion that the Constitution provides absolutely no
protection to one branch of government if another finds a "legal" loophole to
divest it of original power. 49 This would render futile not only the separation
of powers principles embodied in the Constitution, but the Framers' intentions
in creating them.150
Opponents also argue that the line of cases including Swanson and Baxter are
distinguishable from Plaut in that the power to enact patent laws, unlike statutes
of limitations, is specifically granted to Congress in the Constitution.151 Given
such explicit, broad constitutional control over patent legislation, it is argued
that separation-of-powers issues should not be of such concern as they were in
Plaut.152 Justice Scalia, however, acknowledged in Plaut that
[T]he length and indeed even the very existence of a statute of
limitations upon a federal cause of action is entirely subject to
congressional control. But virtually all of the reasons why a final
judgment on the merits is rendered on a federal claim are subject
to congressional control. Congress can eliminate, for example, a
particular element of a cause of action that plaintiffs have found
147 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2253 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
148 See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Article III, § 1
safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional
attempts to transfer jurisdiction .. thereby preventing 'the encroachment... of one branch at
the expense of another.'" (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
850 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
149 See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 138, at 51.
150 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
151 See 157 CONG. REc. S5, 374 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2011) (statement of Michael W. McConnell);
see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
152 157 CONG. Rxc. S5, 374.
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it difficult to establish; or an evidentiary rule that has often
excluded essential testimony; or a rule of offsetting wrong (such
as contributory negligence) that has often prevented recovery. To
distinguish statutes of limitations on the ground that they are mere creatures
of Congress is to distinguish them not at all.15 3
Thus, Justice Scalia explicitly rejected this distinction. Rather, the underlying
rationale of the decision in Plaut is based more on the Supreme Court's"prophylactic" role in upholding separation-of-powers principles-when
Congress instructs courts to reopen a final judgment, it may be impossible to
discern any encroachment into the judiciary's sphere of authority. Nevertheless,
"the doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard rather than a
remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be
identified.'154 Furthermore, conspicuously absent from the rationales
supporting the holdings of Baxter, Swanson, and In re Construction Co. is an
analysis of the constitutional basis and purposes of the separation-of-powers
principles embedded in the Constitution. This is particularly worrisome given
the fact that a very similar analysis served as the framework for the Court's
holding that Congress encroached on separation of powers in Plaut.'55 Again,
the CAFC in Swanson, Baxter, and In re Construction Co. seemed to ignore the
primary basis behind the Court's holding, preferring to focus instead on subtle
distinctions of standards of proof.
Although the CAFC's rigid stance seems less tenable in light of Plaut,
prominent scholars have advanced a clever argument which purports to avoid
any implication of separation of powers whatsoever. These scholars argue that
when the CAFC affirms a PTAB decision that a patent is invalid, the CAFC is
not overruling its prior holding that the patent was notproven invalid156 In other
words, the two outcomes are not technically contradictory, even if they appear
to be, since in upholding a patent's validity, the court is effectively stating only
that the patent is not invalid, rather than affirmatively declaring it valid. Under
such an analysis, the USPTO's subsequent decision does not have the effect of
forcefully reopening a finally adjudicated judgment of the CAFC. Instead it is
'53 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 228-29 (second emphasis added).
154 Id. at 239 ("In its major features (of which the conclusiveness of judicial judgments is
assuredly one) it is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low
walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.").
155 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220 (1995) (discussing the Framers'
rationale behind the separation-of-powers doctrine in finding that Congress had violated those
principles).
156 See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 138, at 52.
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argued that the USPTO's decision merely has the effect of an advisory opinion.
The other party can then use the decision to move the district court to set aside
the prior adverse judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
60(b).157 This rule allows a court, upon motion, to
[R]elieve a party... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect ... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released
or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.158
Thus some argue that the USPTO's decision neither negates nor invariably
forces open a court's final judgment, since the district court retains ultimate
discretion on whether to alter its original judgment. 159
However theoretically sound this argument may seem, practical reality
illuminates its weakness and compels a contrary conclusion. Since the USPTO
would have invalidated the patent from which the original judgment was based,
it is likely that a court will almost always find that FRCP 60(b) justifies a
favorable ruling on the motion. i60
Additionally, to lend credence to this argument would be to assume that
Congress, in elaborating and providing for expedient reexamination procedures,
intended the USPTO's decisions to have a mere advisory character.1 61 Such an
assumption would plainly contravene Congress's explicit purpose in establishing
reexamination procedures in the first place. 62 Rather than promoting efficiency
and encouraging the preservation of judicial resources, a procedure that results
in a mere advisory opinion would directly hinder these goals.
157 Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
158 Because of the significant policy and constitutional arguments in support of final judgments,
a court is to grant relief only under exceptional circumstances. See, eg., R.C. ex rel. Ala. Disabilities
Advocacy Program v. Nachman, 969 F. Supp. 682, 690 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
159 See Letter from Michael W. McConnell, Richard & Frances Professor & Dir. of the
Constitutional Law Ctr., Stanford Law School, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Comm. on the
Judiciary, and to John Conyers, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives (June 23, 2011),
available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent/20Reform/ 20PDFS/M%20McConn
ell.pdf; see also Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 138, at 53 (presenting the opposing arguments to
the unconstitutionality attacks on PTAB patent reexamination, while ultimately arguing on the
side of unconstitutionality).
160 Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 138, at 52.
161 Id.
162 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 7 (1980) (outlining the reasons for adopting
reexamination procedures).
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Perhaps the most compelling argument from the opposing side concerns the
inherent nature of patents.1 63 Since patents are inherently complex and dynamic
in scope, it does not comport with their changing nature to treat the CAFC's
decisions on validity as perpetually binding. If the USPTO erred in granting a
patent, for example, it is economically insensible to cement the error for
eternity simply because the CAFC ruled on the issue before the USPTO had a
chance to correct its mistake.1 64 If patent law can be finally decided by courts,
why would Congress give the USPTO the executive authority to grant patents
in the first place?
Prior to addressing this question, it is important to highlight a point that this
argument raises but does not adequately address. If a CAFC decision
upholding a patent's validity stands despite a subsequent USPTO decision to
the contrary, this does not permanentyfreeZe the patent's status as valid. Rather,
this would only be the case with respect to a party who was previously subject
to an adverse ruling by the CAFC.65 As to any other party, the CAFC's
decision would not be binding.166 This affords the USPTO the flexibility it needs
to regulate patents, while providing patent owners with the comfort and
security of a final judgment. Thus, while the USPTO is free to correct mistakes
in issuing patents when it feels necessary, it would be prohibited from
reopening and altering finally adjudicated decisions in particular instances, much
like the result in Plaut.
However, the present law, as upheld by the CAFC, does not allow for such a
sensible result. Instead, the USPTO, in reopening final judgments, and the
CAFC, in affirming these decisions, are violating principles of separation of
powers by nullifying the quintessential role of finality in judicial decisions. As
the dissent stated in Baxter, finality "predates the Republic. It 'has found its way
into every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious fitness and
163 Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 138, at 51.
164 Letter from Michael W. McConnell, supra note 159.
165 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[W]here a patent has been
declared invalid in a proceeding in which the 'patentee has had a full and fair chance to litigate the
validity of his patent... the patentee is collaterally estopped from relitigating the validity of the
patent.'" (quoting Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333
(1971)))).
166 See id. ("[A] party charged with infringement may challenge 'the validity of patent claims that
were upheld in a prior infringement suit to which it was not a party.'" (quoting Allen Archery,
Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
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propriety, but because without it, an end could never be put to litigation.' "167
Finality is so critical to our system of law that the Supreme Court, in Southern
Padfic Railroad Co. v. United States, deemed it elementary in maintaining the very
social order that our judicial system is charged with protecting:
This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil
courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and
repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial
determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of
social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be
invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property if, as
between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend
the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly
put in issue and actually determined by them.168
This reasoning is not to be limited in particular instances. The finality of a
judicial decision is to be binding on all departments of the government and"may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another
Department of Government."' 169 Even considering the dynamic nature of
patents, the USPTO's current stance goes too far. For an agency which strives
to fulfill its mandate of assuring equal fairness and uniformity in patent
administration, the USPTO startlingly allows for the utter disregard of federal
court determinations of patent law disputes--especially without so much as
deferring to the court's finding of fact or law.
V. PARADoxIcAL ECONOMIC AND EFFICIENCY BURDENS OF THE AIA
Congress established ex parte reexamination as an alternative system to
costly and time-consuming court proceedings. 170 The purpose of ex parte
167 In re Baxter Int'l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(quoting San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336-37 (2005) (quoting
Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6) Wheat.) 109, 114 (1821)).
168 So. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897).
169 Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
170 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6462, 6463; see also
Patent Reexamination: Hearng on S. 1679 Bfore the S. Comm. on the Judiay, 96th Cong. 15-16 (1979)
(statement of Sidney Diamond, Comm'r, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) ("Reexamination
would eliminate or simplify a significant amount of patent litigation. In some cases, the [USIPTO
would conclude as a result of reexamination that a patent should not have issued. A certain amount
of litigation over validity and infringement thus would be completely avoided.').
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reexamination was to streamline the process and reduce costs. 171 But ex parte
reexamination was meant as an alternative to court litigation, not an additional
route. By allowing an unsuccessful party in court a subsequent opportunity to
succeed on the same claim through a reexamination proceeding, the underlying
purposes and benefits of ex parte reexaminations are lost. Instead of reducing
costs and streamlining the system, the system drains both time and money from
patent owners and the judicial system as a whole.
On the other hand, respecting the finality of judicial decisions promotes the
economic and efficiency rationales behind reexaminations. For example, in
Allen v. McCury, the Supreme Court stated that finality "relieve[s] parties of the
cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication.' 1 72
Allowing the USPTO to undo the finality of a judicial court's decision between
the same parties seldom serves these economic aims. 173
In fact, in creating the reexamination process, Patent Commissioner Sidney
Diamond stressed the importance of "carefully protect[ing] patent owners from
reexamination proceedings brought for harassment or spite."' 174 Relatedly,
while the reexamination system was being created, a key consideration by
commentators was the fact that
[A] party threatened with litigation has the opportunity to file
reexamination requests on the patents concerned or, without
doing anything, has the threat of such action to use in any
negotiation which may be in progress. Likewise, a threatened
party also has the opportunity of putting a number of patents into
reexamination which are not even related to the subject matter of
171 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980); see also 126 CONG. REc. 30,364 (1980)
(statement of Sen. Bayh) ("Reexamination will allow patent holders and challengers to avoid the
present costs and delays of patent litigation .... Patent reexamination will also reduce the burden
on our overworked courts by drawing on the expertise of the Patent and Trademark
Office....',.
172 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153-54 (1979)).
173 See 126 CONG. REc. 29,901 (1980) (statement of Rep. Hollenbeck) ("As a result of the
provision for reexamination, the potential conffict can be settled by the Patent Office itself in far
shorter time and at far smaller expense to the challenger or to the patent holder than would be
the case if the only recourse was through the court system.').
174 Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyryght Law Amendments: Hearings on H.R 6933, 6934,
3806, 2414 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberies and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiday, 96th Cong. 594 (1980) (statement of Sidney Diamond, Comm'r, PTO) ('The possibility
of harassing patent owners is a classic criticism of some foreign reexamination systems and we
made sure it would not happen here.').
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the threat. Thus, even where the party threatened with litigation
is in a relatively weak position with respect to the asserted
patents, he can very viably threaten to retaliate against the patent
owner by counter-attacking where the patent owner is in a
relatively weak position. 75
Considering the public's increasing reliance on patents in the United States and
the AIA's goals of increasing the availability of reexamination, it seems likely
that we are going to see more of what the creators of reexamination sought to
avoid. 7 6 Judge Newman herself was one of the first initiators of the patent
reexamination system. 77 True to this argument, Judge Newman emphasized
that she "support[s] the concept of reexamination as an efficient and
economical alternative to litigation in appropriate cases," but was concerned
about "the distortion of this purpose, which was designed to provide a path to
relief not available through the existing examination process.' ' 78 Although
Congress has the constitutional power to legislate in the area of patent law, and
though the USPTO has full authority to act within its congressional mandate,
the constitutional inquiry should not end here.
It appears that the Supreme Court agrees. In the words of the Court
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed
by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether
the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.179
Should the legislature forgo the opportunity to amend the ALA in light of its
deficiencies, this constitutional iceberg will continue to resurface. Only this
175 Anthony H. Handal, Re-examination: Some Tactical Considerations-A Private Practidoner's
Viewpoint, 9 AIPLA Q.J. 249, 254 (1981).
176 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (expressing
concern that "even years of litigated decisions, which may be affirmed piecemeal, could be
rendered meaningless by much later [US]PTO decisions. And, when trial courts come to
understand the fragility of their judgments, stays in the face of reexaminations-which the
[US]PTO grants over 92% of the time-will become inevitable.").
177 Id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("I was one of the initiators of the reexamination
system, the product of the Carter Commission on which I served. My concern is its abuse.").
178 In re Baxter Int'l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1369 (Fed. Cit. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting).
179 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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time, the Supreme Court will most likely take issue with the generation of
powers issues CAFC so readily dismissed.
VI. CONCLUSION
A well-functioning patent system is quintessential to the United States'
economic and spiritual vitality. With the larger role and increasing necessity of
patents in our society, it is essential for Congress to periodically update the
system to keep pace with the rapid advances in technology and the world
economy. Its most recent patent reform effort, the America Invents Act,
though well-intended, will likely result in less protection and more vulnerability
for patent holders. The AlA permits results that are inefficient and at odds
with the reasons for establishing ex parte reexaminations in the first place. This
Act makes substantive changes that impose significant burdens on patent
holders and implicate profound constitutional uncertainties. The procedural
changes, which are aimed at increasing the availability of reexaminations, will
likely serve only to amplify the frequency of these burdens and further the harm
to patent holders. Absent congressional amendments to the AIA, these issues
may soon find their way to the Supreme Court, and with a favorable ruling for
patent holders.
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